Volume 33
Issue 2 Beyond Atkins: A Symposium on the Implications of Atkins v. Virginia (Summer 2003)
Spring 2003

Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from
Gregg to Atkins
Elizabeth Rapaport
University of New Mexico - Main Campus

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight Is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from Gregg to Atkins, 33
N.M. L. Rev. 349 (2003).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol33/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

STRAIGHT IS THE GATE: CAPITAL CLEMENCY IN THE
UNITED STATES FROM GREGG TO ATKINS
ELIZABETH RAPAPORT*
straight is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth
unto life, and few there be that find it.
Matthew 7:14 (King James)
This Article will examine executive clemency decisions in capital cases, from
1977, the year of the first execution after the Supreme Court sanctioned the
resumption of executions in Gregg v. Georgia,' until June of 2002, when Atkins v.
Virginia2 was decided.3 The power of the executive to grant clemency to a capital
defendant can be viewed as a gateway--one last chance to be spared capital
punishment. The gateway to clemency has been exceedingly narrow in this quarter
century era of capital punishment. Perhaps surprisingly, it has been very narrow
indeed for the three classes of capital prisoners who are the focus of this Beyond
Atkins Symposium, 4 and who might be expected to be particularly suitable
candidates for clemency, i.e., juveniles,5 the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill.
Clemency decisions are of course fraught for those at the threshold of execution, but
they are also fraught for governors and Presidents charged with deciding clemency.
This Article will also explore the narrow path the decision makers walk as they
confront the moral and political risks the clemency power entails.

* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico. Portions of this paper were presented at the Northern
California Socio-Legal Speaker Series of the Centerfor Law and Society, School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley, September 30, 2002, and at the Beyond Atkins Symposium sponsored by the New Mexico Law Review,
October 19, 2002. 1 am grateful to the participants at both occasions for their enlightening comments. This article
was written during my tenure as a visiting scholar at the Center for Law and Society, School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley. I would like to thank the law library staff of the New Mexico School of Law, and especially
Lorraine Lester, for prodigious assistance. I am extremely grateful to Michael Radelet for his generosity in sharing
his extensive file of capital clemency materials. Bill Dials and Jennifer Wernersbach provided able research
assistance.
1. 428 U.S. 152 (1976).
2. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3. This Article was completed several weeks before Governor George Ryan granted clemency to every
person then on death row in Illinois, commuting 164 sentences to life in prison and granting four pardons of
innocence. Maurice Possley & Steve Mills, Clemency for All: Ryan Commutes 164 Death Sentences to Life in
Prison Without Parole,CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at 1. At this writing the shock waves initiated by Governor Ryan's
mass capital clemency have barely begun to radiate their influence on capital punishment and capital clemency in
the United States. Although there have been previous blanket grants of capital clemency by governors who opposed
capital punishment, action on this scale was all but inconceivable until Governor Ryan's historic grants in January
of 2003. The Governor Ryan clemencies are outside the scope of this Article, with the exception of some remarks
based on Governor Ryan's activities prior to his decision, some footnotes, and a brief postscript added before
sending it to press.
4. The NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW'S Symposium, Beyond Atkins: A Symposium on the Implications of
Atkins v. Virginia, was held on October 19, 2002, in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
5. Throughout this article, "juvenile" refers to a prisoner who was less than eighteen years old when the
crime for which capital sentence was imposed was committed.
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I. THE GATE: A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE SCOPE AND HISTORY OF
THE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY POWER
A. The ConstitutionalPower

The power to grant clemency, i.e., to remit or delay punishment and to pardon
offenses, is recognized in almost every nation.6 In the United States, the clemency
power is vested by state and federal constitutions in the executive. Although there
are considerable variations in the clemency procedures of the states, the majority of
states follow the federal model, vesting clemency power in the governor.7 The
clemency power is all but plenary, "rarely, if ever,"' subject to review by courts. In
1998, the Supreme Court held that in capital cases only, executive clemency
decisions were subject to review by courts to insure that minimum due process had
been accorded clemency petitioners.9 Thus, clemency can be granted for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.'° Institutional constraints upon the governor
or other clemency authority are all but nonexistent. The history of capital clemency,
however, reveals that from 1977 to 2002 political prudence imposed stringent
constraints.
In capital cases two forms of clemency are available. The first is commutation of
a death sentence to life imprisonment, with or without the possibility of parole. The
second is "pardon," which is an ambiguous term. One meaning of the term implies
exoneration, but the clemency authority may pardon, i.e., set free, a prisoner, capital
or otherwise, without questioning the factual basis for conviction." For example,
heroic service during a prison epidemic or riot might earn a pardon. A pardon
granted in recognition of mistake as to factual guilt is sometimes called a "pardon
of innocence," because it removes the stigma of guilt rather than merely excusing
the prisoner from further punishment. 2Practically speaking, a capital prisoner in the
contemporary death penalty era will be pardoned only when the clemency authority
is satisfied that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted and
sentenced to die.

6. See Leslie Sebba, The PardoningPower-A World Survey, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 83 (1977).
7. For a recent survey of clemency procedures, see Clifford Dome & Kenneth Gewersh, Mercy in a Climate
of Retributive Justice: Interpretationsfrom a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures,25 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 413 (1999). In some states the governor shares the clemency power with an
executive agency, styled a "board." In a handful of states, the clemency authority is assigned to a board that is
independent of the governor, neither appointed by the governor nor purely advisory in function. Because governors
dominate the clemency process in most states, this Article focuses on the role of the governor in clemency.
8. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981).
9. Ohio Adult Authority v. Woodard, 532 U.S. 272 (1998). The process due, however, is minimal indeed.
Justice O'Connor gave two examples of procedures that would fail to comport with Fourteenth Amendment
requirements in her concurrence-"Judicial intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme
whereby a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where the State
arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency process." Id. at 289.
10. Exparte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120-21 (1925).
I1. See W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT this. V & VI (Am. Council on Public
Affairs 1941) (supplying insight for the range of reasons for pardons drawing on the actions of Presidents from 1885
to 1931).
12. Henry Weihofen, The Effect of a Pardon, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 178 (1939).
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B. The HistoricalRoots of the Executive Clemency Power
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution modeled the clemency power of the
President on the English Crown's prerogative of mercy. 3 The Framers' choice of
the executive as sole repository for the clemency power did not result from
imperfect liberation from monarchical habits of thought or the lack of ability to
conceive of other arrangements. In fact, the majority of the original thirteen states
had adopted constitutions that lodged clemency power in the legislature or required
the governor to share the power with legislative counsels. 4 The states adopted the
English or federal model only after ratification of the U.S. Constitution. 5
Alexander Hamilton was a principal proponent of lodging plenary discretion in
the hands of the executive. In FederalistNo. 74, Hamilton argued that "one man"
was more likely "than a body of men" to be conscientious in identifying and acting
upon cases that deserved mercy and to be steadfast in resisting cases where the rigor
of the law should be allowed to take its course.' 6 Hamilton's reasoning is a bit
obscure and not entirely persuasive. One could with equal plausibility advance the
merits of "a body of men," each of whom would have the advantage of colleagues
in deliberation and of group solidarity.
Perhaps a more plausible basis for the assignment of plenary power to the
executive is that it best serves one of the three purposes of the executive clemency
power identified below. It gives the President the power to override criminal law
when in his estimation grave reasons of state so require. The need for decisive action
in such emergencies does suggest the institutional superiority of the executive as the
repository for the power.
C. The Three Functions of Clemency
The Framers assigned plenary clemency power to the executive to achieve three
objectives. The first objective was to allow the executive to moderate, heal, and
avert social conflict by preventing punitive treatment of dissidents and rebels and
to accomplish other state purposes that might require overriding the criminal justice
apparatus. 17An example of the use of the clemency power early in the history of the
republic was President Washington's pardon of participants in the Pennsylvania
Whiskey Rebellion in 1795." A prominent twentieth century example is President
Carter's amnesty of Vietnam War draft evaders. Other types of realpolitik
employments of the clemency power are the release or exchange of spies and the
shielding of a President's agents from the legal consequences of their illegal service,
as done by President George H.W. Bush for several figures in the Iran-Contra affair.

13. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the PardoningPowerfrom the King, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 569, 589 (1991).
14. James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, May God-or the Governor-Have Mercy: Executive Clemency
and Executions in Modern Death-PenaltySystems, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 200, 216 (2000).
15. See id.
16. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton)).
17. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 26-27 (1989). A
well-known twentieth century example includes President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon.
18. Id. at 27; Kobil, supra note 13, at 592.
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The second function of the clemency power is to correct miscarriages of justice
in what could be called "ordinary criminal cases," to distinguish them from cases
where raisons d'6tat are in play. However, the label "ordinary criminal cases," while
useful, suggests a separation of criminal law from politics that is not ultimately
tenable. Politics and the criminal law interact at many levels. For example, a
governor may support capital punishment to project a "tough-on-crime" image
regarded as essential for electoral success. In the context of clemency, "ordinary
criminal cases" raise questions about whether justice has been served rather than
whether its claims should be overridden for reasons of state. 9 The paramount
concern of the Framers with regard to ordinary criminal cases appears to have been
cases of injustice arising from the impossibility of drafting criminal laws that would
incorporate every possible legitimate exception, leading to what Alexander
Hamilton called cases of "unfortunate guilt. ' 20 These are cases where the strict
application of the law has led to the punishment or excessive punishment of
someone who lacks the requisite degree of moral culpability, at least in the eyes of
the clemency authority. The danger that the mechanical application of law will
pervert justice if not leavened with discretion has been appreciated at least since the
time of Aristotle. 21 Necessarily general law cannot contain an exhaustive catalog of
exceptions. Thus, clemency is a means of introducing exceptions not explicit in
extant law, of gaining some purchase for emerging norms of justice not yet well
articulated or fully accepted, and as a hedge against sclerotic law.
The third function of the clemency power also addresses miscarriages of justice,
namely, the correction of the malfeasance and misfeasance of other actors in the
criminal justice system. Thus, the clemency power can be used to correct the
misfeasance or malfeasance of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law
enforcement officers. Such correction was part of the clemency practice of the
English Crown. 22 A contemporary example of this practice is the recent pardons
granted by Governor George Ryan to death row inmates in Illinois who were
coerced by the police into giving false confessions.23
The latter two functions, those of correcting miscarriages of justice, are shared
with the coordinate branches of government. This redundancy is desirable in order
to mitigate and diminish the inevitable and frequent harm done by imperfect laws
and officials. While clemency allows the executive to act as a check on lawmakers
and judges, the other branches are not permitted in turn to check the clemency
decisions of the executive. 24 In this respect, clemency decisions are like a jury

19. This Article does not broach many of the more profound relationships between politics and criminal
justice. Pertinent for its purposes are (1) the executive power to trump criminal justice values in the interests of
statecraft and (2) the tension between pragmatic politics and the vindication of criminal justice values through the
uses of clemency. See infra part IV.
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
21.

See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (350 B.C.), reprintedin BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, at 1019-

20 (Richard McKeon ed., W.D. Ross trans., 1941).
22. See generally Ex ParteWells, 59 U.S. 307 (1885) (describing English clemency practices); United States
v. Wilson, 32 U.S. 150 (1833) (early application of these practices).
23. Rob Warden, On this Day.. .30 Years of the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at 1.
24. The clemency power is not subject to legislative control. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974).
Furthermore, the power is "rarely" subject to judicial review. Ohio Adult Authority v. Woodard, 532 U.S. 272, 280
(1998).
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acquittal in that they are immune from review; however, unlike a jury, which
dissolves upon rendering a verdict, the executive is politically accountable for his
actions. The political controls to which the executive is subject are the normal
hazards of politics and the possibility of impeachment.
1. THE NARROWING PATH: CAPITAL CLEMENCY FROM GREGG V.
GEORGIA TO ATKINS V. VIRGINIA
A. The DecreasedRate of Capital Clemency from 1977 to 2002
The rate of clemency in capital cases is substantially lower in the period from
1977 to 2002 than it was earlier in the twentieth century. It can be conservatively
25
estimated that from the beginning of the twentieth century until the moratorium,
twenty to twenty-five percent of death row prisoners were beneficiaries of executive
commutation of sentence.26 Since the moratorium, a smaller percentage of the
condemned have been executed, but the great bulk of these reductions of sentence
have been judicial. Since 1976, in capital cases that have progressed to the point
at which clemency is decided, typically when execution is otherwise imminent,
clemency has been granted in less than six percent of the cases.28
From the first execution of the contemporary era in 1977 until the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Atkins, 784 executions 29 have been carried out while
only ninety clemencies 30 have been granted. Of these ninety clemencies, forty-eight
were granted to achieve justice or bestow mercy, the two broad rubrics under which
the traditional grounds for clemency fall. The other forty-two were granted for
administrative or instrumental purposes, i.e., to prevent the loss of convictions and
to conserve judicial resources.3 '

25. In the years 1967 through 1976, the so-called "moratorium period," there were no executions in the
United States. During the moratorium, the legal and penal systems awaited clarification of the constitutional status
of the death penalty from the Supreme Court. In 1972, the Court held all extant capital punishment statutes invalid
in Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238, 256-57 (1972). In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976), the
Court began approving efforts to craft acceptable statutes. The first post-moratorium execution took place in 1977.
26. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 255, 262 (1990-91); WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 76 n.b (1974).

27. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: ErrorRates in CapitalCases, 1973-95, The Justice Project,
at http://justice.policy.net/jpreport/finrep.PDF (last visited Apr. 1, 2003); see also TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T. OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 2000, at 10, this. 10 & 13, App. tbl. I
(Dec. 2001).
28. There were 832 cases resolved by execution or clemency from 1977 to June of 2002-784 by execution
and forty-eight by clemency, if the forty-two administrative clemencies, granted to avert retrial, rather than to do
justice or show mercy, are excluded. Death Penalty Info. Center (DPIC), Executions, at http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org (last visited Apr. 1, 2003) (784 executions) [hereinafter DPIC]; DPIC, Clemency (forty-eight
clemencies on humanitarian grounds).
29. DPIC, Executions, supra note 28.
30. See DPIC, Clemency, supra note 28.
31. The administratively motivated clemencies occurred in Texas and Virginia, where retrials would
otherwise have been required as the result of Supreme Court invalidation of capital statutes in those states. Michael
L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289,
293 (1993).
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Of the forty-eight capital clemencies granted in the interest of justice or mercy,"
only nine have been granted to juveniles, the mentally retarded, or the mentally ill
because they fell into one (or more than one) of these three categories. Twenty-one
juveniles 33 and at least thirty-four mentally retarded persons have been executed
since 1976.3" Estimates of the number of mentally ill who have been executed are
more speculative, but available estimates suggest that the number of mentally ill
who have been executed may exceed the number of mentally retarded. 35 Estimating
the numerical strength of both the mentally ill and the mentally retarded in the
capital system is rendered more difficult because they themselves may be unaware
of their condition or may not be disposed to acknowledge it. 36 In the case of the

mentally ill, illness may manifest or worsen after sentence, raising the question of
competency to be executed although the defendant may have been in better mental
fettle when the crime was committed or tried.37 Thus, the number of juveniles,
mentally retarded, and mentally ill persons who have progressed to the point of a

32. On the role of justice and mercy in the theory and practice of clemency, see MOORE, supra note 17, and
Elizabeth Rapaport, Retribution and Redemption in the Operation of Executive Clemency, 74 CHI. KENT L. REV.
1501 (2000).
33. DPIC, Executions ofJuv. Offenders, supra note 28.
34. The conservative estimate that at least thirty-four mentally retarded persons have been executed was
arrived at by paring the list of forty-four executed mentally retarded compiled by Denis Keyes, William Edwards,
and Robert Perske, in order to exclude marginal or dubious cases that may not satisfy the definition of mental
retardation in currency among states that have legislated to forbid the execution of the mentally retarded. Denis
Keyes, William Edwards & Robert Perske, People with Mental Retardation Are Dying, Legally: At Least 44 Have
Been Executed, 40 MENTAL RETARDATION 243, 243-44 (2002). Thirty-four of those listed in the article by Keyes,
et al., have IQs of 70 or less, or are listed as mildly retarded, a designation that excludes persons with IQs above
70. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N: DIAGNOSTIC AND STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 42-43 (4th ed., text rev.
2000). As Justice Stevens notes in Atkins, "an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower... is typically considered the cutoff
score for the intellectual functioning prong of the mental retardation definition." 536 U.S. at 307. In addition to
intellectual deficit, the widely followed American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) definition of "mental
retardation" requires related limitations in adaptive skills and manifestation of mental retardation before the age of
eighteen. Id. n.3. Typically, jurisdictions that prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded accept a cutoff IQ
qualification of 70. For example, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-2. 1(A) (1978), states, "An intelligence quotient of
seventy or below on a reliably administered intelligence quotient test shall be presumptive evidence of mental
retardation." Additionally, Ricky Ray Rector was removed from the list because he suffered an injury creating
disability after age eighteen and therefore did not qualify under the standard definition as a result of the age at which
he became disabled.
35. Two clinical studies suggest the magnitude of the issue. See Dorothy Otnow Lewis, M.D., et al.,
Neuropsychiatric, Psychoeducational, and Family Characteristics of 14 Juveniles Condemned to Death in the
United States, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 145 (1988); Dorothy Otnow Lewis, M.D., et al., Psychiatric, Neurological,
and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15 Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838
(1986).
36. For a discussion on the difficulties mentally retarded defendants face in the criminal justice system, see
James W. Ellis & Ruth Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1985).
The mentally retarded face a greater likelihood of a death sentence because they are more likely to confess falsely
out of a desire to please, are less able to assist in their own defense, make poor witnesses, and may be read as
lacking remorse when their demeanor is misunderstood by juries. Justice Stevens notes that this defenselessness
of the mentally retarded provides a "second justification" for precluding their execution. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
The same factors that hinder the ability of the mentally retarded to effectively defend themselves from capital
sentences probably contribute to the underestimation of their numbers on death row.
37. In Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986), the Supreme Court adopted as a constitutional
doctrine the common law rule forbidding the execution of a prisoner unable to appreciate why he was being
punished or that he was being executed. Although this holding is expressly limited to the insane, some mentally
retarded persons exhibit a similar lack of comprehension.
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clemency decision, and then been denied, exceeds by multiples the number of death
row inmates in these categories (nine) who have received clemency.
B. Reasons and Rhetoric: The Forty-EightGrants of CapitalClemency from
38
Gregg to Atkins
Despite the highly discretionary nature of the clemency power, conservative
reasons were invoked in support of a large majority of grants. In thirty of the fortyeight cases, the governor or other clemency authority enacted the "fail-safe" role,
justifying grants of clemency as rectifying legal system failures. Eighteen of these
"fail-safe" grants were made to vindicate the legal values of factual accuracy and
due process. The other twelve "fail-safe" grants were made to achieve sentencing
equity. Adducing these reasons, governors strove to position themselves rhetorically
as acting to prevent anomalous outcomes distressing to legal system values.
The remaining eighteen grants were made for reasons critical, in varying degrees,
of the contemporary capital punishment regime or at least its results in particular
cases. These governors claimed the traditional authority to grant clemency in the
name of ideals of justice and mercy not captured by legal justice. Among the
beneficiaries of grants seeking to refine and temper rather than satisfy statutory
justice were the nine prisoners whose death sentences were commuted because they
were mentally retarded, mentally ill, or juvenile. One governor, Richard Celeste of
Ohio, was responsible for six of these nine grants. Additionally, nine other cases
involved a variety of merciful grounds. Another governor, Toney Anaya of New
Mexico, accounted for five of these nine grants. In the quarter-century period
bounded by the Gregg and Atkins decisions, only six governors, augmented by two
such grants by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole, have granted capital
clemency for reasons that venture beyond the "legalistic."
Table 1 presents the types of reasons for granting capital clemency in the Gregg
to Atkins period as well as the frequency with which each type is encountered. The
Appendix presents the record of the 48 capital clemency grants made to enhance
justice or mercy.
Table 1: Types of Reasons for Grants of Capital Clemency
1977-2002
Reason for Grant
"Legalistic"-Doubts about trial accuracy or procedure
"Legalistic"-Sentencing equity
Extra-legal-Justice or Mercy
(of which nine were mentally retarded, mentally ill, or juveniles)
Total

Number of Grants
18
12
18
48

38. The forty-eight cases comprise all grants from 1977 to June of 2002 that were made to achieve justice
or bestow mercy. Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 31, document forty-two grants made for administrative reasons.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

1. "Legalistic" Grants-Doubts about Procedure and Accuracy
"Legalistic" grants are apparently easier to make and defend than "extra-legal"
grants, since the governor positions himself as shoring up rather than overriding the
legal order. Table 1 shows that there were eighteen grants on grounds of doubts
about the accuracy or procedural integrity of the capital trial. One such grant was
made to Earl Washington in Virginia, a mentally retarded man convicted of
rape/murder. Washington's death sentence was commuted to life in prison in 1994
because DNA evidence led Governor Wilder to entertain doubts about his guilt.3 9
Some six years later, in 2000, the growing prestige of DNA evidence allowed
Governor Gilmore to grant Washington a pardon of innocence.4'
Some governors have insisted that the standard for execution exceeds that
required for lesser penalties. For example, in 1989, Governor Buddy Roemer of
Louisiana commuted the death sentence of another mentally retarded petitioner,
Ronald Monroe, because of doubts about guilt provoked by learning that the police
had withheld evidence implicating another suspect. 41 Governor Roemer expressed
a rationale that other governors have relied upon in capital commutations-he
believed the test for guilt ("beyond a reasonable doubt") was met, but not the test for
execution: "[M]y test is if there is any doubt, I cannot make a mistake on the side
of execution... in an execution in this country the test ought not to be reasonable
doubt. The test ought to be is there any doubt....42
President George W. Bush, who during his eight years as governor of Texas
presided over no less than 140 executions,43 was also pledged to the "fail-safe" or
legalistic model of clemency.44 He adhered to this position when he granted
commutation to the notorious self-confessed mass murderer Henry Lee Lucas.45
Bush was put in doubt that Lucas was responsible for the particular murder for
which he was sentenced to die in Texas.46 Evidence had been developed that Lucas
gilded the lily of his murderous career by confessing to crimes he had not
committed. 47 Bush positioned himself in explanation of his clemency as a champion
of due process by stating, "I take this action so that all Texans can continue to trust
the integrity and fairness of our criminal justice system. ,48
The Donald Paradis case was also one in which the withholding of evidence from
the defense eroded the governor's confidence in the trial result. 49 In 1996, Governor

39. Frank Green, Washington's Death Sentence Commuted: New Trial Could Occur If State Law Is
Changed, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 15, 1994, at Al.

40. Francis X. Clines, Pardoned Inmate's Lawyers Attack Virginia Evidence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000,
at A22.
41. Jack Wardlaw & James Hodge, Execution Halted by Roemer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug.
17, 1989, at A-I.

42. Id.
43. DPIC, Number of Executions by State, supra note 28.
44. Bruce Tomaso & David McLemore, Bush Spares Lucas from Death Penalty; Governor Commutes
Sentence to Life, Cites Doubt over Guilt, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 27, 1998, at' A.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Bob Herbert, In America: Death Row Survivor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at A29; see generally Alec
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Phil Batt of Idaho commuted Paradis's death sentence.5 ° Weak trial representation
also played a role in this and other cases. Paradis was represented by a lawyer six
months out of law school who had never before tried a felony case.5' In 2001, an
52
Idaho court overturned Paradis's conviction and freed him.
While grounds for commutation such as withheld evidence and substandard legal
representation recurred among the legalistic grants, there were also unique legalistic
grounds. For example, Governor Huckabee of Arkansas granted commutation to
Bobby Ray Fretwell in 1999 at the urging of a juror in the Fretwell trial.53 The juror
came forward after years of soul searching because he had voted for the capital
sentence against his conscience out of fear of ostracism in the small community in
which the killing had occurred.54 No doubt was raised about Fretwell's guilt, but the
juror who came forward criticized the poor performance of Fretwell's attorneys
during the penalty phase of the trial. 5
Despite the long history of challenges to capital punishment on the grounds of
racial bias, the issue of race was prominent in only one of these due process
salvaging grants. In 2001, Governor Mike Easley of North Carolina commuted the
sentence of Robert Bacon, Jr.56 While Easley was extremely circumspect in
explaining his decision, there were published allegations that Bacon, a black man
who had killed his white girlfriend's
estranged husband at her urging, was sentenced
7
by a jury influenced by racism.
In sum, the defense of due process values saves the criminal justice system from
its own failures and thus constitutes the most conservatively positioned assertion of
the clemency power. It is therefore unsurprising that due process values figure
prominently in the justification of capital clemency.
2. Legalistic Grants-Sentencing Equity
Granting clemency in order to achieve sentencing equity is a more aggressive
deployment of the power than those defending due process, in that the governor may
well be vindicating a claim that juries and appellate courts performing
proportionality review have rejected. The values protected are nevertheless
entrenched in capital punishment law and the governor's action is positioned
rhetorically as preventing an anomalous result discordant with established capital
justice.

Wilkinson, A Night at the Beast House, NEW YORKER, Feb. 13, 1995, at 52.
50. Bill Hall, Batt Decides the Paradis Case with Dignity and Care, LEWISTON MORNING TRIB., May 29,
1996, at 10A.
51. Marty Trillhaase, Consider the Paradis Legacy, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Jan. 16, 1997, at C6.
52. Herbert, supra note 49.
53. Rachel O'Neal & Doug Peters, Juror's Anguish Leads Huckabee to Halt Execution, ARK. DEM.
GAZETrE, Feb. 6, 1999, at Al.

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Although Easley was unforthcoming about the reasons for his decision, there were press reports that
some jurors had expressed hostility towards Bacon, a black man, because he was romantically involved with a white
woman. See, e.g., Easley Imposes Fair Punishment, MORNING STAR (Wilmington, N.C.), Oct. 5, 2001, at 10A.
Concerns about race were also prominent in the Ohio clemencies granted by Governor Celeste. See infra part IV(D).
Governor Celeste's concern was with systemic racism in Ohio, not with charges of bias raised in specific cases. Id.
57. See Easley Imposes Fair Punishment, supra note 56.
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Sentencing equity requires both "horizontal" and "vertical" equity.58 Horizontal
equity is achieved when persons convicted of crimes of similar severity and evincing
similar levels of culpability receive similar sentences.59 Vertical equity is achieved
when punishments are meted out in such fashion that more serious crimes are always
punished more severely than lesser crimes.6 °
Twelve commutations were granted on sentencing equity grounds. Most of these
were granted to achieve horizontal equity. Wendell Flowers, for example, was
sentenced to die for the death of a fellow inmate killed as a result of an inmate plot.
Governor Jim Hunt of North Carolina commuted the death sentence of Flowers in
1994 because two co-defendants received life sentences. 6 1 Governor Hunt made the
following statement: "[S]everal inmates were involved in this murder. From the
testimony of the eyewitness it is not exactly clear what role Wendell Flowers carried
out. But it is clear as a bell that Flowers did not kill Rufus Watson alone. 62
One particularly controversial case was granted for reasons of vertical equity. In
1996, Governor Jim Edgar of Illinois, a Republican and death penalty proponent,
commuted the death sentence of Guinevere Garcia. 63 Garcia shot her ex-husband in
a robbery attempt that went awry.' She had previously served a term for murder of
her infant daughter. 65 Governor Edgar compared her case to that of John Wayne
Gacy, who was executed for killing thirty-one victims. 66 He also compared her case
to that of a man who kidnapped a woman, raped her repeatedly, kept her prisoner
in the trunk of his car for two days, and then shot her. 67 Finally, he compared her to
two hundred other convicted multiple murderers in Illinois prisons not under
sentence of death.68 In granting commutation to Garcia, Governor Edgar explained
his decision in these words: "There is going to be a lot of criticism of this. This is
not going to be politically popular. [Garcia] is not the kind of case that I had in mind
to restore the death penalty ... .Executions are for the
when I voted as a legislator
69
worst of the worst.,

58. See Rapaport, supra note 32.
59. Id.
60. Clemency for the mentally retarded and the mentally ill could also be justified on grounds of vertical
equity as remedial retributive justice. The mentally retarded and seriously mentally ill lack the "the highest level
of adult culpability" that should be requisite for the most extreme penalty. Before Atkins, many jurisdictions
permitted the capital punishment of the mentally retarded. The mentally ill and juveniles have yet to receive
categorical protection in every capital jurisdiction. Clemency for members of these classes therefore requires a
willingness to assert extra-legal values of justice or mercy that the law has not been pledged to vindicate.
61. Andrea Weigl, Hunt Commutes Sentence, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 22, 2000, at Al.
62. Id.
63.

Rick Pearson, Despite Criticism on Garcia, Edgar Says He Was Right, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 1996, § 1,

at 5.
64. Don Terry, After a Life of Desperation, A Female Inmate Asks to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at 8.
Garcia, herself the victim of appalling childhood abuse, claimed to have killed her daughter to spare her from abuse
from the same family member abuser. Id.
65. Id.
66. Emily Wilkerson, EdgarIgnores PoliticalConsiderationsin Clemency, STATEJ.-REG. (Springfield, 1ll.),
Jan. 22, 1996, at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Pearson, supra note 63, at 5; Eric Felten, Rule of Law: The Death Penalty's Glass Ceiling, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 24, 1996, at A13.
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3. Extra-Legal Grants of Clemency for Juveniles, the Mentally Retarded, and
the Mentally Ill
Nine of the forty-eight clemencies granted in capital cases since the resumption
of executions in 1977 were granted because of youth, mental retardation, or mental
illness. In these few cases, the executive authority was willing to stand on the
ground later taken in Atkins, at least with respect to the mentally retarded. These
clemencies were the result of the recognition that the immature and the disabled "do
not act with the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult
criminal. 70
Three governors and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole have made grants
of this type. Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio made eight capital clemency grants
in total, of which six were made to persons who were mentally retarded, mentally
ill, or both. 71 Governor Celeste had multiple bases for each of his grants, including
concern that racism prevailed in the capital punishment system in Ohio.72 However,
he was influenced by mental deficits and mental illness, among other factors, in six
of the eight cases. 73 Governors Mel Carnahan of Missouri74 and James Gilmore of
Virginia75 and the Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole each granted clemency to
one inmate who was mentally ill. Only one grant took age at time of crime into
account. However, that grantee, Alexander Williams, who was commuted in
Georgia in 2002, is also severely mentally ill. 76 At least three additional mentally
retarded death row inmates are among the forty-eight, but these grants were not77
made because of their mental retardation but because of doubts about their guilt.

70. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
71. See Celeste Spares 8 Sentenced to Die in Chair, THE BLADE (Toledo, Ohio), Jan. 11, 1991, at I
(reporting that three of the six commuted have IQs below 70 and three were diagnosed as mentally ill). Debra
Brown, Elizabeth Green, and Leonard Jenkins are mentally retarded. Dick Kimmins & William A. Weathers,
Celeste Spares Eight Killers from Death Row, CIN. ENQUIRER, Jan. 11, 1991, at Al; Mary Beth Lane, Celeste
Commutes Eight Death Sentences, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Jan. I1, 1991, at I-A.; At End of Term, Ohio's
Governor Commutes Death Sentencesfor 8, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1991, at 12. Willie Jester, Donald Mauer, and Lee
Seiber are mentally ill. Lane, supra; Stark Killer's Sentence Commuted by Celeste, BEACON J. (Akron, Ohio), Jan.
I1, 1991, at Al; Mary Yost, Convicted Killer Was Ready for the Electric Chair, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 1I,
1991, at 5B.
72. Kobil, supra note 13, at 630; Daniel T. Kobil, Do the Paperwork or Die: Clemency, Ohio Style?, 52
OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 679-80 (1991) (stating that Celeste explicitly invoked mental health and mental disability as
among the criteria he employed in reaching his decisions and also linked his concern about racial bias to the
inclusion of six blacks among those spared); John Quigley, Racism in Death Penalty, COLUMBUS FREE PRESS, Feb.
1991, at 5.
73. Celeste Spares 8 Sentenced to Die in Chair, supra note 71.
74. Carnahan concluded that Bobbie Shaw's death sentence "may be fundamentally unfair," because the jury
was not told of his brain damage and schizophrenia. Alan Bavley & Lynn Horsley, Carnahan Reduces Inmate's
Sentence: Mental Health Advocates Applaud Decision, KAN. CITY STAR, June 3, 1993, at Al.
75. Calvin Swann had a long history of schizophrenia, which ultimately led Governor Gilmore to commute
his sentence. Frank Green, Gilmore Grants Swann Clemency: Sentence Commuted to Life Without Parole, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, May 13, 1999, at Al.
76. Williams was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic while in prison. Sue Anne Pressley, Ga. Inmate's
Death Sentence Commuted, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2002, at A2.
77. Learie Alford, Ronald Monroe, and Earl Washington are described as mentally retarded. All three were
granted commutation because of gubernatorial doubts about guilt. See Deborah L. lbert, Two Get Decision on
Mercy, TALLAHASSEE DEM., June 20, 1979, at I A (Learie Alford); Jack Wardlaw & James Hodge, Execution Halted
by Roemer, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Aug. 17, 1989, at A-I (Ronald Monroe); Francis X. Clines,
Pardoned Inmate's Lawyers Attack Virginia Evidence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A22 (Earl Washington).
A fourth man, Darrell Edwin Hoy, whose Florida death sentence was commuted in 1980 by Governor Graham, was
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More frequently governors refused to open what could well turn out to be a
Pandora's Box of deserving death row petitions in cases of youth, the mentally
retarded, or the mentally ill. Governors routinely, if not ritualistically, defer to the
jurisdiction and the competence of the judiciary. Typical is the response of Governor
James Gilmore of Virginia. In 1998, Gilmore denied the petition of Dwayne Allen
Wright. 78 Wright had killed an Ethiopian immigrant mother of three during an
attempted rape, which culminated a five-day shooting spree.7 9 Wright was
seventeen-years-old at the time of this horrific crime. 0 His clemency lawyers
alleged low intelligence, mental illness, and woefully substandard legal
representation at trial as grounds for clemency. 81 Denying Wright's clemency
petition, Governor Gilmore explained that "today [Wright] is 26. He is not a child,
nor is he a model prisoner. 8 12 Governor Gilmore concluded, "Questions regarding
Wright's mental deficiencies were thoroughly investigated, presented to the jury,
and ultimately resolved at trial. 83
The small number of juveniles, mentally retarded, or mentally ill who have had
their death sentences reduced, relative to the number in these three categories of
persons who have been executed, 84 raises questions about the health of the clemency
system. Clemency is a multi-purpose institution. 5 One of its least controversial uses,
common to many political traditions,86 is prevention of excessive punishment in
what Alexander Hamilton called cases of "unfortunate guilt," i.e., cases in which the
severity of the sentence imposed exceeds moral culpability.8 7 Another of the
traditional functions of clemency has been to be a bellwether of emerging criminal
justice norms, leading society in the direction of needed reform. 8 In Atkins v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court categorically prohibited the execution of the mentally
retarded, because by virtue of "their disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and
control of their impulses.. .they do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct" and are so regarded by their
fellow Americans.89 Parallel arguments can be made about the level of moral
culpability of seriously mentally ill9° and juvenile9 capital prisoners. If the majority

described as "slow" and "partially retarded." Memorandum from Patrick D. Doherty, Hoy's Attorney, to Governor
Graham (Dec. 12, 1979) (on file with author); see also Robert Driver, Editorial, Of Convictions and Clemency,
CLEARWATER SUN (Fla.), Jan. 2, 1980, at 8A. (reporting that Hoy's sentence was commuted to achieve sentencing
equity).
78. Craig Timberg, Virginia Executes Inmate Who Killed Woman at 17, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at A19.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra part 1(A).
85. See supra part I(C).
86. Sebba, supra note 6.
87. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
88. Kobil, supra note 13, at 611.
89. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
90. Mental illness is a statutory mitigating factor weighing against the imposition of the death penalty in the
majority of capital punishment states. See Ellen F. Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance
in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 291, 296-97 (1989).
91. The Supreme Court has held that no person below the age of sixteen at the time of their crime may be
executed and no person below the age of eighteen can be executed absent explicit statutory authorization of the
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correctly portrayed American values, many governors have been unwilling or unable
to grant commutation to capital prisoners whose ineligibility for capital punishment,
from the moral point of view, was shimmering on the border of general recognition.
4. Extra Legal Grants of Clemency Based on Opposition to the Death Penalty
or Mercy
Avowedly anti-capital punishment governors have taken a variety of approaches
to the use of their clemency powers in capital cases. For example, pre-moratorium
Governor Pat Brown of California would only grant clemency when there were
grounds other than his standing moral and religious demurral.92 Governor Winthrop
Rockefeller cleared the fifteen-member death row of Arkansas by commutation just
as he left office early in 1970. 9" Governor Rockefeller took positions rarely heard
from a governor in a capital punishment state in recent years, both in deploring
capital punishment and in his adherence to the possibility of rehabilitation for capital
prisoners. Governor Rockefeller wrote, "many individuals now on death row-albeit
guilty of crimes of violence-are demonstrably capable of rehabilitation. 94
More recently, only one post-moratorium governor has chosen to rest
commutation squarely on opposition to capital punishment. Governor Toney Anaya
commuted the death sentences of all five men on New Mexico's death row in
1986. 9' Governor Anaya
premised his grants explicitly on religious opposition to
96
punishment.
capital
In the post-moratorium period, only one governor and the Georgia Board of
Pardons and Parole have granted commutations on grounds that included
recognition of rehabilitation. Governor Ted Schwinden of Montana commuted the
death sentence of David Cameron Keith in 1988. 9' In addition to factual questions
about Keith's level of culpability for the murder he committed, he was injured
during his arrest and as a result blind and in need of a wheel chair.98 He was also, as
are so many who are not granted clemency, remorseful and religious. 99 In 1990, the
Georgia Board of Pardon and Paroles granted the second and last commutation on
the grounds of rehabilitation to William Moore."° In addition to his rehabilitation
in prison, the Board was affected by the steadfast opposition to Moore's execution
from the victim's family.' '

practice. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). Five of
the thirty-eight capital punishment states permit the execution of sixteen-year-olds and an additional seventeen states
allow execution of seventeen-year-olds. See DPIC, Minimum Death Penalty Ages by State, supra note 28.
92. See EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN & DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY 121-22 (1989).
93. Winthrop Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 21 CATH. U. L. REV. 94 (1971).
94. Id.at 101.
95. Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 31, at 298.
96. Id.
97. Bob Anez, David Keith Spared,MONT. STANDARD, Dec. 30, 1988, at 1.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The Georgia Board of Pardons and Parole was influenced by several other factors as well, including that
Moore pleaded guilty in 1974, when the requirements of the death penalty were uncertain. But remorse and
rehabilitation clearly influenced the Board, as did the request for mercy from the victim's family. Holly Morris,
Board Spares Murderer, ATL.CONST., Aug. 21, 1990, at Al.
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Darrell Mease was the beneficiary of a controversial grant made by Governor Mel
Carnahan of Missouri.' 0 2 In 1999, Mease's death sentence was commuted because
Pope John Paul II asked Governor Carnahan not to allow the execution, which was
scheduled to occur while the Pope was in St. Louis. 0 3 The Pope approached
Governor Carnahan personally to make the request. Governor Carnahan explained
the impact of Pope John Paul's request as follows: "then he stopped and talked to
me...and asked me to show mercy....This was a very unusual circumstance, having
a papal visit....And the Pope, during his time there, to show particular interest in this
' 4
individual, to seek me out to discuss that, moved me very greatly."'
Governor Fob James of Alabama refused to give a public explanation of any kind
for commuting the death sentence of Judith Ann Neelley. 10 5 Acting on his last day
in office, Governor James never made himself available to the press; however, the
press speculated that Neelley's gender and the efforts on her behalf by leading
10 6
churchmen were responsible for the decision of the deeply religious governor.
Neelley herself had become deeply religious in prison and was supported in her
petition for clemency by prominent Alabama churchmen. 107
III. WHY THE STRAIGHT GATE?
There are two plausible explanations for the reduced rate of capital clemency in
the era from Gregg to Atkins. The first explanation is that under contemporary
capital punishment law, defendants undeserving of capital punishment are less likely
to be capitally sentenced. Furthermore, if those undeserving are capitally sentenced,
then errors, whether of procedure, accuracy, or proportionality of sentence to crime,
are more likely to be discovered and corrected in the appellate and post-conviction
phases of cases. The second explanation is that the contemporary politics of crime
inhibit governors and other clemency authorities from granting clemency. Both
explanations are valid.
The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to forbid capital punishment except
in cases of the worst crimes and the worst criminals.'0 8 Many capital jurisdictions
have further narrowed the reach of capital punishment, excluding more classes of
crime and criminals from its reach than Supreme Court mandates would require.
Such exclusions have restricted the imposition of capital punishment upon the
population that is the particular concern of this Beyond Atkins Symposium.

102.

Gustav Niebuhr, GovernorGrants Pope'sPleaforLife ofa Missouri Inmate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999,

at Al.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. There were abundant reasons for granting clemency in her case, as in many others that have been denied.
She was an eighteen-year-old savagely abused wife married to a twenty-nine-year-old sadist when she killed two
young girls at the direction of her husband. The girls were kidnapped by the couple and raped by Neelley's husband.
Alvin Neelley, the husband, was sentenced to life in prison. At her trial the jury recommended life but the judge
overrode and sentenced her to death.
106. Tom Gordon, Spokesman: James PartlyHeeded Jury in Neelley Sentence, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Jan. 29,
1999, at 5C.
107. Id.
108. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311.
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Eighteen of the thirty-eight capital punishment states and the federal jurisdiction
already prohibited execution of the mentally retarded before the Atkins decision.' 09
Sixteen capital punishment states and the federal government treat eighteen years
of age at the time of a crime as the minimum age for eligibility for capital
punishment. 0 A further narrowing of the reach of capital punishment is achieved
in the contemporary era because capital jurisdictions treat mental illness as a factor
in mitigation that weighs in favor of life rather than death."' In addition, there is a
substantially higher rate of judicial relief in the contemporary era that also reduces
the number of doubtful cases on death row that would previously have survived to
the point where clemency petitions are lodged." 2 Yet, despite statutory filters and
the increased rate of judicial reversal of capital sentences, governors have allowed
the execution of dozens of juveniles, the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill since
1976.
Governors have failed to grant clemency in cases in which it is reasonable to
suppose they themselves believed clemency was warranted but nevertheless chose
not to grant because they believed the political price would prove too high. A welldocumented example illustrates this phenomenon. Then Governor of Arkansas Bill
Clinton interrupted his campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination in
1992 to return to Arkansas to deny clemency to Ricky Ray Rector.' Rector had
shot and killed a policeman and then immediately attempted suicide with a shot to
his own head." 4 He survived but was severely and permanently brain damaged as
a result of the wound." 5 His subsequent intellectual functioning was so
compromised that Rector saved the pecan pie dessert from his last meal for an afterexecution snack.'1 6 Clinton had been denied a second term as governor of Arkansas
the first time he sought re-election in part because he was regarded as soft on
crime.' l7 Thereafter, he was staunch in his support for capital punishment. Whatever
his views on the trial and execution of competent murderers, in the Rector case
Clinton was obliged to decide whether or not to allow the execution of a man who
was lobotomized." 8 Similar scenarios may have been enacted, perhaps dozens of
times, in statehouses in the capital punishment states with similar results since 1976.
109. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314.
110. DPIC, Age Minimums by State, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=205&scid=27

(last

visited Apr. 1, 2003).
111.

See Berkman, supra note 90.

112. Liebman, supra note 26; George A. Dix, Appellate Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO.
L.J. 97 (1979) (discussing the enhanced role of appellate review in death penalty cases in the post-Gregg capital
punishment regime).
113. Sam Howe Verhovek, The Nation: Halt the Execution? Are You Crazy?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, §
4, at 4. Rector was not mentally retarded under the standard definition accepted by the Supreme Court in Atkins
because the condition did not manifest before the age of eighteen. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3.
114. Verhovek, supra note 113.
115. Id.

116. Id.
117. Peter Applebome, Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on Governor's Politics,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25,
1992, at 8. Clinton never granted capital clemency when he was the governor of Arkansas. He was liberal in
granting non-capital clemency in his first term as governor but not in subsequent terms. Id. As President, he
commuted the federal death sentence of David Chandler in 2001. DPIC, Clemency, supra note 28.
118. The press speculated that Clinton overcame his personal inclinations in the Rector case for political
reasons. See, e.g., Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 117; Anthony Lewis, Abroad
at Home: The Two Clintons, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at A17.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

Granting clemency in high visibility cases, among which capital cases surely fall,
has always carried political risk. Several factors jointly explain why governors face
graver risks in the post-Gregg era than earlier in the twentieth century:
(1) Rising crime rates--Crime rates climbed from 1960 through the 1980s,
breeding increased fear and anger in the alarmed public.119
(2) Collapse of the rehabilitative model of punishment-Rehabilitation,the
preeminent criminal justice philosophy guiding professionals and policy makers
earlier in the twentieth century, was discredited. Faith in the curative model
crumbled in the face of rising crime rates, lack of demonstrable results in curbing
recidivism, and the criticism that the black and the poor were serving more prison
time under indeterminate sentencing regimes than higher status whites for similar
crimes. 2°
(3) Rise of the neo-retributivistmodel ofpunishment-Retributivismre-emerged
as the dominant criminal justice philosophy. Neo-retributivism, disencumbered of
primitive vengefulness, emerged as the penal philosophy committed to the equal
treatment of similarly situated offenders. 2' The measure of punishment, neoretributivists argued, should be "just desert."' 2 Desert and therefore punishment
should be proportional to the severity of the offense and the level of culpability of
the offender.123 Punishment should not be determined by the pseudo-science of cure,
the caprice of parole boards, or skin color or wealth. 24 Theorists who popularized
the return to retributivism were not advocates of Draconian punishment, nor did they
necessarily endorse capital punishment, but rather they argued that severity of
punishment should consistently reflect severity of offense and degree of culpability
of the offender. 2 '
(4) The politicization of crime control policies-By the 1970s, crime control
policies had become salient issues in electoral politics. A poisonous interaction
occurred between the public's fear of crime and the prominence of crime control as
a political issue. As refracted through the electoral politics, retributivism took on
harsh aspects that the initial academic revival of the doctrine had lacked. Politicians
found it increasingly difficult to resist enacting or endorsing policies that resulted
in longer prison terms, larger prison populations, and more death sentences and
executions. An outgrowth of this dynamic that is particularly evident in the arena
of capital clemency is the enhanced, and increasingly institutionalized, role for
victims and the survivors of victims.' 26 The political price of clemency rises with

119. Crime rates declined in the 1990s, but have not returned to 1960 levels. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS,
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 304 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2000).
120. See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981); MICHAEL
TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).
121. For a lucid and influential statement of the neo-retributivist position, see ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING
JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
122. Id. at 66-76 (discussing the principle of commensurate deserts).
123. See id. at 27-32 (noting the potential evils of broad discretion in the sentencing decision).
124. See id. at 66-76.
125. See Rapaport, supra note 32, at 1515.

126. For an illuminating account of the history of the victim's rights movement, see Lynne Henderson, CoOpting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, l0 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 579 (1998).
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every actual or 1anticipated
press report of the anguish of survivors of victims of
27
heinous crimes.

(5) Enhancedjudicialprotections-TheWarren Court due process reforms and
post-1976 capital constitutional jurisprudence have led to the public perception that
the courts can now adequately protect the rights of defendants charged with capital
crimes. Many layers of appeal stand between the condemned and their death. By the
end of the year 2000, only ten percent 28 of the condemned had been executed after
an average length of stay on death row that had reached the ten-year mark. 129 Half
of those capital prisoners whose cases have advanced at least through the stage of
direct appeal have had their sentences judicially reduced. 3 °
Governors not disposed to offer clemency frequently adopt the stance that, except
in extraordinary circumstances of late discovery of evidence of actual innocence,
there is little need for executive clemency in the contemporary capital system. In a
statement that typifies the abstemious perspective, then-Governor George W. Bush
of Texas explained his position:
[D]ecisions about the death penalty are primarily the responsibility of the
judicial branch ....
The executive branch is far more limited. I view it as a
failsafe, one last review to make sure that there is no doubt the individual is
guilty and that he or she has had the due process guaranteed by our Constitution
and laws ....
Idon't believe my role is to replace the verdict of the jury with my
own....

Estimates of the health and utility of the institution of executive clemency, and
of its efficacy within the contemporary capital punishment system, vary widely.
Sanguine observers find that the post-Gregg capital punishment system's so-called
"super due process ' protections for capital defendants at both trial and in later
judicial review reduces the need for clemency to that of a "fail-safe" for rare cases
of latter discovered evidence of actual innocence."'
Others are persuaded that vulnerable defendants, prominently the mentally
retarded, the mentally ill, and prisoners with actual innocence claims, are not
adequately protected within the legal system and are routinely denied clemency
when other avenues are exhausted.' 34 Some commentators have suggested that

127. See GARLAND, supra note 120. Governor George Ryan is at this writing contemplating the clemency
petitions of more than 160 Illinois death row prisoners. The anguish expressed by the survivors of victims has

shaken supporters of clemency and perhaps Governor Ryan as well. While defense attorneys sought to focus public
attention on law enforcement corruption and brutality and the mental retardation or illness of their clients, distraught
victims became the cynosure of press and public attention. See John Keilman, Families Direct Anger at Ryan:
GovernorBlamed for Stirring Grief at Clemency Bids, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 18, 2002, at 1.
128. A few states execute at rates far in excess of the national average. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Staying Alive:
Executive Clemency, Equal Protection,and the Politics of Gender in Women's Capital Cases, 4 BUFF. CRM. L.
REV. 967 app. thl. 1 (2001).
129. SNELL, supra note 27.

130. Liebman, etal. supra note 27.
131. GEORGE W. BUSH, A CHARGE TO KEEP 148 (1999).
132. Margaret Jane Radin coined this phrase. See Margaret Jane Radin, Her Cruel Punishment and Respect
for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S.CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1149 (1980).
133. For example, in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 391 (1993), Chief Justice Rehnquist describes
clemency as the "fail-safe" method of preventing the execution of the innocent.
134. See Acker & Lanier, supra note 14; Kobil, supra note 13; Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The
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clemency should be transformed to become the province of a bureaucratic agency
within the executive and that this agency's decisions should be subject to robust
judicial review.135 From time to time, other critics have called for the abolition of the
power of clemency in order to protect the democratically enacted popular will and
the decisions of juries.136
Whatever view one takes of this ancient institution's contemporary vitality, it
should be acknowledged that of the hundreds of governors in thirty-eight execution
states during the last quarter century, only nineteen governors, the Georgia Board
of Pardons and Paroles, and a single President have been willing to grant capital
clemency at least once.' 37 Tumbrils rolled past statehouses 805 times.
IV. GOVERNOR AT THE GATE: MORALITY AND POLITICS IN THE
EXERCISE OF THE CLEMENCY POWER
A. ContemporaryMorality and the Ascendancy of Retributivism'38
Every criminal justice philosophy with purchase in current debates in the United
States provides ample justification for substantially greater use of the clemency
power than the typical executive has been willing to risk. Looking only to moral
considerations, abstracting for the moment from political considerations, governors
across a wide spectrum of moral orientations could readily find justification for
expanded use of the clemency power. Retributivism, the ascendant philosophy
influencing sentencing policy, is also the most restrictive in its criteria for legitimate
uses of the clemency power. If this most restrictive philosophy supports expanded
use of the clemency power, then a fortiori, moral outlooks that recognize a wider
range of grounds for clemency will do so as well.
On a strict retributivist view, each duly convicted offender should without fail or
favor suffer the full measure of deserved punishment, neither more nor less.'39
Retributivism is distinguishable from "redemptive" views of criminal justice and
punishment in that retributivists regard rehabilitation or social contribution after the
criminal offense as having no possible moral weight in argument for mitigation of
punishment. 40 The only legitimate grounds for reduction of sentence, whether
judicially or by a clemency authority, would be to redress wrongful conviction or
remediate an excessive sentence.

Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311
(1996); Alyson Dinsmore, Comment, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49
UCLA L. REV. 1825 (2002).
135. See Kobil, supra note 13, at 622.
136. Opponents of Governor Fob James's 1999 commutation of Judith Ann Neelley proposed a constitutional
amendment to strip the governor of clemency power in capital cases. See, e.g., Mike Cason, Bill Would Remove
Power to Commute, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 20, 1999, at IA.
137. Thus far in the short history of the revived federal death penalty, there has been one grant of clemency,
by President Clinton, and two executions in 2001. See DPIC, Executions of Federal Prisoners, supra note 28.
138. The following discussion will be limited to the operation of clemency in what I have called "ordinary
criminal cases"; no effort will be made either to generalize or treat separately cases where the executive overrides
the operation of the criminal justice system in order to protect the nation from factional division or to conduct
foreign policy.
139. See MOORE, supra note 17, for a detailed discussion of the retributive approach to clemency.
140. See Rapaport, supra note 32.
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Contemporary retributivists, however, unlike those of earlier periods, view each
offender as entitled to a sentence that does individualjustice-punishment should
reflect the degree of culpability of the offender as well as the seriousness of the
offense.' 4' Retributivists of earlier periods, including no less a luminary than
Immanuel Kant, did not systematically distinguish degrees of culpability as bearing
on just deserts. Indeed, Kant argued for the death penalty for a wide class of
murderers. 4' 2
Contemporary retributivists differ about the characteristics that define the class
of murderers who should be subject to capital punishment; 143 however, persons with
the mental and emotional resources of young children or chronic paranoid
schizophrenics are unlikely to be regarded as sufficiently culpable to merit execution
by neo-retributivists. What has been said of governors' moral outlooks could equally
well be said of citizens, whose moral values many governors believe they ought to
honor, or at least weigh, in the making of clemency decisions.
Indeed, the Atkins opinion relies both on the contemporary or neo-retributive
theory of criminal sentencing and on widespread public acceptance of neoretributivism in holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of the
mentally retarded.'44 Justice Stevens has produced a morally coherent justification
that draws on widely shared beliefs. While retributivism does not necessarily
exhaust or fully characterize the criminal justice values of contemporary Americans,
it would be difficult to deny that retributivism has a prominent place in the
contemporary constellation of criminal justice values. In the event that a governor
should develop the desire to venture forth as a leader in the dangerous shoals of
criminal law reform, through exemplary clemency decisions or other devices, Justice
Stevens in Atkins has provided grist for the rhetorical mill.
B. Opening the Gate: Atkins v. Virginia and the Evolution of Retributivism
As problematic as the politics of clemency may be, the jurisprudence of excluding
the mentally retarded from the reach of capital punishment was easy work for Justice
Stevens in Atkins, save for one knotty dimension of justification-the matter of
public support for the exclusion. Established Eighth Amendment death penalty
jurisprudence requires objective evidence of a social consensus in support of
contracting the scope of capital punishment in order to exclude a class of
criminals.' 45 Eighth Amendment principles deliver the exclusion of the mentally
retarded almost mechanically once the evidence for consensus is secured. The Atkins
decision itself provides ample jurisprudential justification, mutatis mutandis, for the
exclusion of juveniles and the mentally ill as well as the mentally retarded from

141. The principle or slogan "individual justice" was long associated with the rehabilitation school of criminal
justice. See Williams v. N.Y, 337 U.S. 241, 247-49 (1949), for what is perhaps the classic judicial embrace of
individual justice within the framework of rehabilitation penology. The particular achievement of late twentieth
century retributivists was to reinterpret retributivism as requiring the tailoring of penalties to each individual
criminal's degrees of moral culpability. See VON HIRSCH, supra note 121; Rapaport, supra note 32.
142. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 139 (John Ladd trans., 2d ed. 1999) (1797).
143. Not all contemporary retributivists endorse capital punishment. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy,
RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 244 (Wilfred Sellars & Keith Lehrer eds., 1979).
144. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
145. Id. at 311-12.
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capital prosecution-except in so far as the Court's methodology
146 requires objective
evidence of a social consensus repudiating such executions.
In Atkins, Justice Stevens' analysis begins with the proposition that since the
inception of the contemporary death penalty era, retribution and deterrence have
been the accepted social purposes of capital punishment.'4 7 Justice Stevens dismisses
the relevance of deterrence in cases of mentally retarded murderers because their
cognitive and behavioral impairments deprive them of the ability to calculate risks
sufficiently to be deterred. 148 The Supreme Court in Atkins relies upon a retributive
theory of punishment, as it has throughout the history of Eighth Amendment capital
jurisprudence since 1976. The Court treats this theory of punishment as (1)
capturing important and pervasive social values of our society and (2) itself
evolving, and indeed progressing or maturing, along with the society that supports
it.149

Retribution is served when "the criminal gets his just deserts."' 50 Since the Gregg
decision the Supreme Court has adhered to what Stevens calls a "narrowing
jurisprudence,"' 5' in accordance with which only the most serious crimes and the
most culpable criminals have been deemed to deserve death. Thus, in Coker v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the rape of an adult woman, and non-lethal
crime in general, cannot be punished by death. 152 The Court likewise held in
Enmunds v. Florida that an accomplice who neither caused nor intended to cause
death is not eligible for capital punishment." 3 Since Gregg, the Eighth Amendment
has been interpreted to forbid capital punishment unless culpability rises above the
level of "the average murderer."' 5 4 Justice Stevens concludes, "the lesser culpability
155
of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution."'
The Atkins majority relies upon clinical psychology and psychiatry for an account
of the deficits that establish the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
murderer.156 However, to establish that the Eighth Amendment no longer tolerates
the execution of the mentally retarded, Justice Stevens relies on the development of
a social consensus against the practice. The "clearest and most reliable objective
evidence"' 57 of the emergence of that consensus is the large number of execution
states that have in recent years legislatively prohibited the execution of the mentally
retarded.'58 Relying primarily on the strength of this evidence, Justice Stevens

146. The Supreme Court refused to revisit the question of the execution of juveniles within months of its
decision in Atkins. In re Stanford, 123 S.Ct. 472 (2002) (mem.).

147. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
148. Id. at 318 ("[T]here is abundant evidence that [the mentally retarded] often act on impulse rather than
pursuant to a premeditated plan.").
149. Id. at 304 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)) ("The Eight Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.").
150. Id. (quoting Enmunds v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)).
151. Id. at 319.

152. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-96 (1977).
153. Enmunds v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982).
154. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.

155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
158. Eighteen states and the federal jurisdiction forbid the execution of the mentally retarded. In 1989, the
Supreme Court declined to protect the mentally retarded, citing the fact that only two states excluded the mentally
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concludes, "today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less
culpable than the average criminal."1 59
A governor, however, might pause before relying on public acceptance of the
mature retributivism of the Atkins majority, even if he or she were confident that
these evolved values were widely held. Governors must worry about vocal and
appealing critics, such as the victims of crime, whose outcry may overwhelm more
measured and less strident sections of public opinion. Few governors have been
willing to invest scarce political capital in offering relief to the retributively
excessively punished or in using clemency as a means of addressing wider issues of
criminal law reform. Nevertheless, nineteen governors, one President, and the
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles have awarded capital clemency during the
period from 1977 to 2002. Several have made multiple grants and a few have
attempted to use the power to inspire capital punishment law reform.
C. Politicsat the Gate of Heaven
An unknown number of governors whose moral outlook justifies commutation
of sentence for the mentally retarded, the seriously mentally ill, juvenile murderers,
and other death row petitioners have refused commutation. Does it follow, without
more, that these executives have acted immorally in withholding commutation?
Consider a capital clemency case that arose during the governorship of Pat Brown.
Governor Pat Brown of California (1959-1967) recounts a story in his memoir
that illustrates the distinctive moral challenges that confront the executive who
wields the power of clemency."6 In capital cases the power is no less than discretion
as to life or death. Governor Brown opposed the death penalty. 161 He was presented
with a clemency petition for capital prisoner Richard Lindsey, a brain damaged man
who pleaded guilty to the murder of a child.162 Governor Brown was disposed to
grant the petition; however, he was informed that the legislator possessing the swing
vote on a bill giving farm laborers a living wage would vote against the bill if
Governor Brown commuted Lindsey's death sentence. 63 Governor Brown was fully
committed to the bill."6 He allowed the execution to take place, and the farm labor
legislation passed in due course. Brown reports that he has never made peace with
his decision. 165
Governor Brown's choice was tragic, but it was not immoral. His decision in the
Lindsey case, as he recounts it, was prompted by a dramatic choice. He could spare
one tormented soul or relieve the suffering of an exploited and powerless section of

retarded from the reach of capital punishment. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Justice Stevens notes in
Atkins that the "consistency of the direction of change is more telling than the number of states who have spoken
on this issue." 536 U.S. at 315. He also appeals to other evidence for consensus, including religious opinion. Id. at
316 n.21. Justice Stevens further reminds us that the judgment of the Justices themselves is "brought to bear" on
the issue. Id. at 319.
159. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
160. BROWN & ADLER, supra note 92, at 72-80.
161. Id. at 153-63.
162. Id.
at 74.
163. Id.
at 75.
164.

Id.

165. Id.
at 84.
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the state's working population. The latter choice, he hoped, would help effect a
permanent change in the status of farm laborers. The Lindsey clemency case is an
example of circumstances where the realization of the Governor's criminal justice
values, the belief that capital punishment is wrong and that Lindsey was undeserving
of capital punishment because of his mental disabilities, are weighed by the
executive against the achievement of an important political goal. It is to his credit
that Governor Brown was never easy in his conscience about his role in the
execution of Lindsey; however, it ought not be inferred from his troubled conscience
either that Governor Brown believed his decision was morally wrong or indeed that
it was morally wrong. A governor's discretion reflects both the structure of the
moral duty to exercise clemency and the tensions between that duty and his full
array of role duties.
The governor as clemency authority has discretion akin to that of any moral agent
in private life who finds himself, e.g., asked to forgive a debt or a breach of
friendship, or to give money or other aid to someone in need to whom he owes no
assistance. Mercy and charity are what moral philosophers call "duties of imperfect
obligation," in contrast to duties of "perfect obligation." When a duty of the latter
sort arises, e.g., a duty to return money borrowed on the strength of a promise to
return it, the promise creates an obligation to return the money and creates a
correlative right of the lender to have the obligation satisfied. In the case of a duty
of imperfect obligation, such as charity or mercy, no particular person who is
desirous of the benefit has a right to it. However, the person who is uniformly
unforthcoming, who never finds opportunities to be merciful, fails in her duty to be
merciful. A governor's clemency role is similar in that granting and refusing are
likewise discretionary. The role is dissimilar in that the governor also represents the
disposition of the citizens to be merciful. Should she fail to make proper use of the
power, the governor's failure taints the citizens as well.
Further, the governor's political role requires discretionary decisions about
husbanding and investing scarce political capital in order to accomplish divers
public tasks and objectives. Governor Pat Brown made such a calculation when he
determined not to spare the life of Lindsey.' 66 He gave up an opportunity to protect
a vulnerable individual from morally excessive punishment for what he deemed to
be a sufficiently important objective otherwise unobtainable. The institution of
clemency as constitutionally configured compels such calculations but does not
ordain their outcomes. To conclude that Governor Brown's adherence to the farm
workers justified his decision in the Lindsey case is not to say that any invocation
of the costs of a grant of clemency to either the governor's agenda or his "political
viability"'167 automatically relieves a governor of moral censure for failure to grant
clemency. Governors are subject to criticism for failure to muster courage, display
leadership, and absorb political costs in the execution of their clemency duty as in
all other role responsibilities.

166. See id.
167. The phrase came into the national political lexicon with Bill Clinton, who, even as a student opposed
to the war in Vietnam, was circumspect in order to protect his future "viability." See DAVID MARANISS, FIRST IN
HIS CLASS: A BIOGRAPHY OF BILL CLINTON (1996).
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Nothing here stated should be understood to deny that the moral claims of a
capital petitioner with serious mental illness for commutation of sentence are
compelling. Rather, the point is that the institution of clemency does not function
as a guarantor against inhumane and unjust treatment. It is a hard saying, but to
possess a moral or human right does not necessarily imply that any extant authority
is obliged to vindicate that right. 6 ' Clemency is one of several bulwarks designed
jointly to reduce error, injustice, and inhumane treatment of persons caught in the
coils of the criminal justice system. Indeed, unlike governors exercising clemency
authority, prosecutors and courts have stringent duties to both the public and
defendants to serve justice in every case.'69 These actors inevitably fail on some
occasions, as do other actors in the system, such as defense attorneys who are unable
or unwilling to measure up to the responsibility of adequately representing a capital
defendant. Sentencing statutes and practices are also inevitably flawed. The
institution of clemency exists to provide another opportunity for a just or humane
response. Governors legitimately weigh clemency against such objectives as passage
of a minimum wage bill when the two fall into practical competition. Clemency is
rarely "free" from the executive's point of view. 7 0 Exercise of the clemency power
may put a governor in peril of being perceived as usurping the authority of the
legislative or judicial branches, of defying the popular will, and of receiving
debilitating criticism from press and opponents.
However, there is at least one circumstance in which a governor ought to grant
clemency without regard to political cost. When a petition is based upon a claim of
actual innocence and the governor believes that exoneration has been established,
a pardon of innocence ought to issue. Clemency encompasses both the power to
reduce penalties-either to redress an unjustly harsh penalty or to be lenient for any
other reason-and to acknowledge and void a wrongful conviction. In a case where
actual innocence has been discovered, the moral duty of the only remaining possible
dispenser of justice is stringent. Execution or completion of any other sentence
against an innocent person defies the virtually universally accepted rule of law that
actual guilt is a requisite for punishment.' A governor who failed to vindicate so
fundamental a principle would do mortal damage to his own legitimacy and grave
damage to that of the state. A grant under these circumstances should not, in any
likely event, expose a governor to politically damaging criticism because the
governor would be responding to a circumstance in which the ground for action is
generally well understood and respected. The practical costs of a pardon of
innocence should be minimal for a governor with even the most modest political and
rhetorical skills. No grieving survivor will be deprived of justice, solace, or closure
by sparing a prisoner who did not murder a father or daughter.' 72

168. Thus, when a governor grants a clemency petition grounded in, for example, rehabilitation, he may
frustrate the fight claimed by a victim's survivors or by citizens for strict retribution.
169. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that the duty of the prosecutor is "not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done....").
170. Denying clemency may also have costs, as was reported by Governor Pat Brown in the Lindsey case.
See supra part IV(C).
171. See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).
172. The sentencing of John Walker Lindh, the so-called "American Taliban," produced an interesting
vignette in which the principle of no punishment without proven guilt was invoked by the judge to quell the call
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In sum, the discretionary structure of the clemency authority reflects the practical
limitations on the governor's resources to ameliorate criminal justice and to
accomplish other goals. Yet, when a governor confronts a petition from a capital
prisoner whom he believes is categorically less culpable than the average adult
criminal, the moral pressure to grant clemency increases with the extent to which
practical costs of granting are manageable or can be rendered manageable through
reasonable effort. More harshly, the continued "political viability" of a number of
governors, purchased at the cost of allowing the execution of those less culpable
than the average adult criminal, was probably not justified from the social point of
view. Not all pragmatic decisions partake of the tragedy of the limitations that
thwart those charged with the use of public power in the public interest; rather, some
reflect merely the attachment to office on the part of incumbents.
D. Clemency and Opposition to CapitalPunishment
Although clemency is most commonly regarded as a means of redressing unjust
results and responding to the equities in individual cases, it has also played a role
in the history of law reform.' 73 Clemency has been an incubator and laboratory for
defenses and mitigation not yet developed to the point of being accepted legal
doctrines.' 74 For example, before the law recognized self-defense or insanity as
75
defenses, the only appeal was to the clemency of the Crown.'
Despite the general record of circumspection compiled by contemporary
executives, several modem governors have tried to use their clemency power to
exercise moral leadership in the movement to abolish capital punishment. Governor
Toney Anaya of New Mexico cleared his state's small, five-man, death row.
Governor Anaya was bitterly disappointed by the lack of public support from
religious leaders in the state, whose support he thought critical in achieving abolition
17 6
and whom he expected to join him in garnering support for abolition.
Additionally, moratorium-era Arkansas Governor Winthrop Rockefeller cleared his
state's small, fifteen-man death row fifteen years earlier.' 77
Governor Richard Celeste of Ohio commuted eight capital sentences in 1991.
Governor Celeste did not attempt to commute the sentences of all persons on Ohio's
much larger death row. At least a hundred prisoners remained on death row at the
end of Celeste's term of office. Governor Celeste, a public opponent of capital
punishment, attempted to use his clemency power to raise the issue of racial bias in
Ohio's administration of the death penalty.178 Six of the eight commutations were

for the blood of a pariah. Judge T.S. Ellis III felt called upon to invoke the principle in the face of ardent protests

that the vilified Lindh deserved more than his twenty-year sentence. The judge was taken to task by the father of
CIA agent Mike Spann, who died in the armed melee during which Lindh was discovered by American authorities
to be among captured Taliban soldiers. Spann wanted Lindh punished for the murder of his son. Judge Ellis
remarked that "[o]f all the things [Mike Spann] fought for, one of them is that we don't convict people in the
absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, NEW YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 59.
173. MOORE, supra note 17, at 84.
174. Kobil, supra note 13, at 572; Acker & Lanier, supra note 14, at 206.
175. MOORE, supra note 17, at 18.
176. Toney Anaya, Statement by Toney Anaya on CapitalPunishment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 177, 179 (1993).
177. Rockefeller, supra note 93, at 94.
178.

Mary Beth Lane, Group Cites Race Mix of Nine Death Rows, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Jan. 12,
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granted to blacks. 179 Governor Celeste explained his actions as a response to the
racism in Ohio's capital punishment system.'80 He noted that Ohio's death row had
a much higher percentage of black inmates than states with larger percentages of
black residents.' Four of the grants to blacks were to black women. There were no
white women on death row. Governor Celeste interpreted the absence of white
women on Ohio's death row as additional evidence of racism. 81 2 Ultimately, though,
Governor Celeste's reform message was obscured and pre-empted by the ensuing
public and legal challenge to his authority to issue the commutations, which like
83
Governor Anaya's were issued on the eve of his departure from office. 1
At this writing, Governor George Ryan of Illinois is poised on the brink of what
is likely to be a substantially larger mass commutation of death row inmates.
Governor Ryan has publicly contemplated the possibility of granting mass clemency
to the approximately 160 capital prisoners who have sought clemency. I18 The
reception of Ryan's action should prove quite instructive in assessing the didactic
and law reform potential of clemency action. Governor Ryan has avoided two
mistakes made by Governors Celeste and Anaya, who waited until the very last days
of their terms both to commute and to make their case for commutation to the
public. As a consequence, no public dialogue about capital punishment or clemency
ensued while the governor enjoyed the platform of incumbency. Additionally, the
public and supporters of capital punishment were deprived of the opportunity to
dissuade or remonstrate with a sitting governor. In contrast, Governor Ryan has laid
the groundwork for his anticipated clemencies.
Governor Ryan has created as well as seized opportunities to explain and
persuade. He instituted a moratorium on capital punishment in 2000 in response to
the circumstance that Illinois had compiled a post-moratorium record of twelve
executions and thirteen exonerations. 8 He subsequently established a commission
to study the death penalty in Illinois and has made comprehensive recommendations

1991, at I-A; Quigley, supra note 72.
179. Lane, supra note 178.
180. Id.
181.

Id.

182. Id.
183. Alan Johnson, Voinovich Wants Clemencies Undone, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1991, at BI.
Governor Celeste's successor, Governor George Voinovich, made an unsuccessful effort to void the commutations
in Ohio courts. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a writ of prohibition, acknowledging the plenary
authority of the executive to commute sentences. State ex rel. Maurer v. Sheward, 644 N.E.2d 366, 373 (1994).
184. Governor Ryan granted commutation or pardon to the entirety of Illinois' 164-person death row. Possley
& Mills, supra note 3.
185. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan "Until I Can Be Sure": Illinois Is First State to Suspend Death
Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2000, at 1. Governor Ryan stated that the moratorium was spurred on by a Chicago
Tribune five-part investigative series, "The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois." Id. This five-part series includes
the following articles: Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Death Row Justice Derailed:Bias, Errors,and Incompetence
in Capital Cases Have Turned Illinois' Harshest Punishment into Its Least Credible, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1999, at

I (first of a five-part series); Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses Cloud Verdicts: With Their Lives at
Stake, Defendants in Illinois CapitalTrials Need the Best Attorneys Available, but They Often Get the Worst, CHI.

TRIB., Nov. 15, 1999, at I (second of a five-part series); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, The Inside Informant, Nov.
16, 1999, at I (third of a five-part series); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, A TorturedPath to Death Row, Nov. 17,
1999, at I (fourth of a five-part series); Steve Mills & Ken Armstrong, Convicted by Hair,Nov. 18, 1999, at I (last
of a five-part series).
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for law reform based on its findings. 186 In the months leading up to the end of his
term, he has joined in speculation as to whether he will commute Illinois' entire
death row, or only certain categories of persons, such as the mentally retarded, and
those convicted on jailhouse informer or accomplice testimony, the unreliability of
' Such testimony played a prominent role in the convictions
which he has criticized. 87
exonerated in the thirteen highly publicized cases of
later
those
of some of
88 The lesson to be drawn from this recent history is that a governor
exoneration.'
who wishes to have an impact on public opinion and catalyze law reform must
issue of public policy, and risk
invest in the leadership role, as with any other
89
office.'
in
while
criticism
public
to
exposure
A further lesson is that in the present climate of public opinion, in which concern
for the conviction of the innocent has played a wedge role in softening public
support for capital punishment, a courageous executive willing to invest the political
capital could actually find political advantage in a principled stand. 9 ' The present
climate of concern about conviction of the innocent imparts a reformist edge even
to the most conservative due process oriented clemencies and renders such grants,
as well as clemency on other grounds, a bit less daunting. The Atkins decision itself
may encourage governors to explore the possibility that the public may be receptive
to clemency in cases of severely mentally ill capital prisoners.
The history of capital clemency in the United States from the Gregg decision to
the Atkins decision inevitably focuses on the abundance of political caution the
record discloses. Despite the seductions of prudence, there have been and there will
be, chief executives who are unable to ignore the responsibility that comes with the
clemency power. This reckoning brought liberal abolitionist and Democrat Richard
Celeste of Ohio to step forward and state, "The decision to grant or withhold
executive clemency is probably the most awesome responsibility that comes with
in good
being governor. It was a responsibility I accept, and one which I could19not
1
conscience leave unexercised as I reach the end of my term in office."'

186. Report of the Former Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment (Apr. 2002), at www.idoc.state
.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
187. There has been a steady flow of publicity about Ryan's intentions. See, e.g., Jodi Wilgoren, G.O.P.
Death-Penalty Feud Sinks to First-Name Calling, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at Al.
188. Armstrong & Mills, Ryan "Until I Can Be Sure": Illinois Is First State to Suspend Death Penalty, supra
note 185.
189. An avalanche of adverse publicity has recently poured down upon Governor Ryan and his pending
capital clemency decisions. The decision that the Prison Review Board would hold public hearings for the
approximately 160 death row inmates seeking clemency has proved a disappointment for death penalty opponents
and attorneys representing the capital petitioners. The hearings have not been the forum for educating the public
about the flaws of the Illinois capital punishment system that critics of the system have sought. The hearings and
press coverage of them have been dominated by the anguish and anger of the families of the murder victims. See,
e.g., Keilman, supra note 127; Dave McKinney, Ryan Fails to Win Over Families of Victims, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec.
7, 2002, (News Spec. Ed.), at 5.
190. Governor Ryan has been both lionized and excoriated for his capital clemency initiative. Scandalous
revelations about the Department of Motor Vehicles when he held the post of Secretary of State in a previous
gubernatorial administration have also hurt him politically. Dirk Johnson & Elizabeth Austin, A Leap of Faith: A
Governor's Controversial Last Hurrah Clears Out Illinois' Crowded Death Row, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 20,2003, at 34.
He has been described as "positioned halfway between a Nobel Peace Prize and federal indictment." Alan Ehrenhalt,
The Paradox of Corrupt Yet Effective Leadership, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at Al.

191.

Kimmins & Weathers, supra note 71.
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Republican Michael Huckabee of Arkansas won reelection as Governor of
Arkansas in 2002 despite willingness to grant clemency, including commutation of.
one capital sentence. 92 Owning his decisions, Governor Huckabee joined earlier
governors in characterizing his responsibilities as religious duties, fulfillment of
which requires rising above expediency to foster reform of criminal justice and
justice in individual cases. He has stated, "If one acts by pure raw political instinct
and a pure Machiavellian approach to public office.. .you'll never, ever, ever, ever
grant clemency."' 93 Furthermore, when asked whether there was any one clemency
decision he would change, Governor Huckabee refused to be baited and responded
that he made his decisions guided by religious ethics and the hope of his own
salvation. He said,
Ultimately, my life will not be judged by voters who can be swayed by 30
seconds of television.. .The ultimate evaluation of my life will be made by a God
who will look at every breath I took from birth to death, and I want him (sic) to
evaluate my life by the totality of it not by any one moment.' 94
Governors who have sensed that their mettle and their public service are tested by
clemency decisions in a manner more enduring than the current political season have
understood something that has eluded their brothers and sisters in office.
GOVERNOR GEORGE RYAN OF ILLINOIS: A SPECULATIVE
POSTSCRIPT
In granting blanket clemency, Governor Ryan stopped just short of embracing the
complete abolition of capital punishment. He declared that absent sweeping reform
in Illinois and other death penalty states the capital punishment system was
"broken," too error-prone to condone."' Governor Ryan announced, "Because the
Illinois death penalty system is arbitrary and capricious and therefore immoral, I
shall no longer tinker with the machinery of death...." The Governor noted that in
total seventeen death row inmates had been exonerated in Illinois and defended his
blanket grants
as the only means available to him of preventing further "catastrophic
96
failure."1
It is much too early to assess what the impact of Governor Ryan's mass capital
clemency will have on the future of clemency and the history of capital punishment
in the United States. The first wave of reaction, in progress at this writing, is
dominated by angry criticism. Governors and other close students of the Illinois
capital clemencies will long remember the powerful media invocations of the sense
of justice denied and betrayed on the part of the survivors of the victims of those
granted clemency. There is, however, even in the angriest reactions, an implicit

192. O'Neal & Peters, supra note 53.
193. Michael R. Wickline, Answer to God on Clemencies, Huckabee Says, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZErrE, Dec.
6, 2002, at AI.
194. Id.
195. Possley & Mills, supra note 3.
196. Id. While Governor Ryan has continued to advocate the reform of capital punishment, he chose to justify
his clemency grants with the very words used by Justice Blackmun in his famous dissent in Callins v. Collins, 510
U.S. 1141, 1144 (1994), to announce his enlistment in the abolitionist ranks, "From this day forward, I shall no
longer tinker with the machinery of death."
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homage to Governor Ryan. He has broken a virtual taboo on the scope of the use of
the clemency power. He has created space for debate and action where none had
previously existed.
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APPENDIX
Reasons for individual capital clemency grants, 1977-2002
State
Georgia
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
Florida
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
New Mexico
Maryland
Georgia
Montana
Louisiana
Georgia
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Ohio
Virginia
Georgia
Virginia
North Carolina
Missouri
Virginia
Illinois
Virginia
Idaho
Virginia
Texas

Date
1977
1979
1979
1980

Name
Charles Hill
Learie Alford
Clifford Hallman
Darrell Hoy

Governor
Pardons & Parole Bd.
Graham
Graham
Graham

Reason
Sentencing Equity
Accuracy/Fairness b
Sentencing Equity'
Sentencing Equityd

1980
1981
1983
1986
1986

Graham
Graham
Graham

Sentencing Equity'
Sentencing Equity f
Accuracy/Fairness

Anaya
Anaya
Anaya
Anaya
Anaya
Hughes

Mercyh
Mercy'

1986
1986
1986
1987
1988
1988
1989
1990
1991

Richard Gibson
Michael Salvatore
Jesse Rutledge
David Cheadle
Joel Compton
Richard Garcia
William Gilbert
Michael Guzman
Doris Foster
Freddie Davis
David Keith
Ronald Monroe
William Moore
Debra Brown

Pardons & Parole Bd.
Schwinden
Roemer
Pardons & Parole Bd.
Celeste

Sentencing Equity"
Mercy'
Accuracy/Fairness P
Mercy'
Mercyr

1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992

Rosalie Grant
Elizabeth Green
Leonard Jenkins
Willie Jester
Beatrice Lampkin
Donald Maurer
Lee Seiber
Joseph Giarratano
Harold Williams
Henry Bassette

Celeste
Celeste
Celeste
Celeste
Celeste
Celeste
Celeste
Wilder
Pardons & Parole Bd.
Wilder

Accuracy/Fairness'
Mercy'
Mercy"
Mercy'
Sentencing Equity'
Mercy'
Mercy y
Accuracy/Fairnessz
Sentencing Equity"
Accuracy/Fairness bb

1992
1993
1994
1996
1996
1996

Anson Maynard
Bobby Shaw

Martin
Carnahan

Accuracy/Fairness_
Mercy"'

Earl Washington
Guinevere Garcia
Joseph Payne
Donald Paradis

Wilder
Edgar
Allen
Batt

Accuracy/Fairness'
Sentencing Equity"f
Accuracy/Fairnessu
Accuracy/Fairness" h

1997
1998

William Saunders
Henry Lee Lucas

Allen
Bush

Mercy"
Accuracy/Fairness_

Merc)'
Mercy'
Mercy'
Accuracy/Fairness m
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1999

Judith Ann Neelley

James

Sentencing

1999
1999

Darrell Mease
Bobby Ray Fretwell

Carnahan
Huckabee

Mercy"
Accuracy/Fairnessm

Equitykk

m

Virginia
North Carolina

1999
1999

Calvin Swann
Wendell Flowers

Gilmore
Hunt

Mercy""
Sentencing Equity'

Maryland

2000

Glendening
Hunt

Accuracy/Fairness PP
qq
Accuracy/Fairness

North Carolina

2000

Eugene Colvin
Marcus Carter

Federal

2001

David Chandler

President Clinton

Accuracy/Fairness '

Oklahoma

2001

Phillip Dewitt Smith

Keating

Accuracy/Fairnessss

North Carolina

2001

Robert Bacon, Jr.

Easley

1
Sentencing Equity"

North Carolina

2002

CharlieMason Alston

Easley

Accuracy/Fairness uu

Georgia

2002

Alexander Williams

Pardons & Parole Bd.

Mercy"
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